|   The first three 
              parts : 
            - Evaluation and Vision of the Future 
              - Proposals and Projects 
              - Report on the Participatory Process Used 
              for the Evaluation and Future of the Alliance 
             
               - The second 
              stage of the Alliance : 
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            | 
          THE SECOND STAGE OF THE ALLIANCE
             
              By Pierre Calame pic@fph.fr 
            First Contribution to a Collective Thinking Process
            A/ First Stage of the Alliance: an Attempt to 
              Put Things in Perspective
             
              2. Structuring the Alliance (1998-1999) 
            During this second period, the Alliance was structured 
              in two aspects: through the adoption and the development of communication 
              tools; and through a collective organization and governance of the 
              Alliance. 
            The adoption of common communication tools, i.e. 
              the means both for Allies to carry on discussions and facilitate 
              their collective work and for the Alliance to be given public viewing, 
              had been a concern since the beginning, supported by a newsletter. 
              As of 1998, however, the abundance of the material produced and 
              the diversity of systems in use made it necessary to upscale. For 
              this, the Alliance benefited from the development of the Internet, 
              which soon became indispensable, given its international nature 
              and the new possibilities, therefore the new momentum, it offered 
              for the structuring of a Òworld civil society.Ó The FPH financed 
              the release and operational costs of a new magazine in three languages, 
              Caravan. It also contributed to setting up and structuring an Alliance 
              Web site and began to finance the development of tools and methods 
              for remote communication, in connection with the Web site: a Directory 
              of Allies, a research data base, and the first Internet e-forums. 
            All of this, which was indispensable for the AllianceÕs 
              continuity, also produced growing operational costs. 
            The collective organization of the Alliance occupied, 
              during that period, a relatively small number of AlliesÑprobably 
              less than 200, and at some moments as few as thirty. But those were 
              the most active, most committed Allies. This led them naturally 
              to raising, more explicitly than the others, the question of the 
              AllianceÕs collective orientation. This question proved to be especially 
              difficult, or even contradictory, for a series of reasons mainly 
              due to the originality of the Alliance:  
             
              
                - Turning the Alliance into an institution, with executive bodies 
                  and rules, carried the danger of changing is very nature, closing 
                  it up, reducing its pluralism, and, in the process, making it 
                  more commonplace and less useful.
 
                 
                - Formalizing the functions that would have to be filled showed 
                  that the institutionalization of each of these would be complex 
                  and expensive in terms of time and money.
 
                 
                - The strength of the Alliance, thus far, had resided in the 
                  continuity of the process, which was guaranteed by the method 
                  and the timetable. The FPH had proposed them and the Allies 
                  had become associated with the Alliance on these bases. There 
                  was the danger of having this continuity contested by the executive 
                  bodies of the institution that would be set up.
 
                 
                - The FPH, in the hypothesis of the institutionalization of 
                  the Alliance, would keep, at least for some time, Òthe power 
                  of money.Ó In 1996, on request of the early Allies, the FPH 
                  clarified the role that it was prepared to play in the Alliance: 
                  it committed itself to backing the Alliance up to and including 
                  the World Assembly (then planned for 1999-2000); it would finance 
                  as a priority Òwhat was most difficult,Ó i.e.: the development 
                  of new socioprofessional networks, reaching out to spheres that 
                  were very different from those that constituted the Alliance 
                  as a majority so far; and the organization of the World Assembly. 
                  What would have happened if the priorities of the FPH and those 
                  that might be set by the new legal bodies of the Alliance diverged?
 
               
             
            We did not know how to overcome these contradictions. 
              The long debates in 1998 wore out some of the Allies, who then found 
              in the Alliance the usual tensions of the world of nonprofit organizations 
              and unions, which they thought had been avoided in the Alliance. 
              The outcome of those debates resulted in fact in a tenuous solution: 
              the Alliance would not be institutionalized and would therefore 
              have no formal members nor executive bodies; nevertheless, the Allies 
              designated, by voting for candidates that most of them did not know, 
              an International Facilitation Team (IFT), made up partly, moreover, 
              of FPH employees. 
            As soon as the IFT began to advance priorities 
              that differed from those of the FPH, a dead end was ahead. The visibility 
              of the perspectives darkened and suspicion set in. These tensions 
              and contradictions did not stop the work of the Alliance from progressing, 
              the proposals from being developed, and the methods from becoming 
              clearer. 
            During this period, the international context also 
              changed. Isolated at the time of its birth in its project of progressively 
              structuring a world civil society, the Alliance was soon caught 
              up with and quickly left behindÑat least in terms of numbers and 
              visibilityÑby more traditional nonprofit movements, such as ATTAC, 
              the lightning success of which revealed the aspiration, ten years 
              after the fall of the Berlin wall, to a collective resistance against 
              the rapid unhindered spread of Òneoliberal globalization.Ó 
            Many other pre-existing movements felt the need 
              for new forms of coordination to make this resistance more effective. 
              In addition, the success of the citizensÕ campaign against the more-or-less 
              secret negotiation of the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment), 
              the success of international boycott actions, and the considerable 
              media impact of the demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle showed 
              that the development of the Internet had changed the political and 
              social hand and had enabled global actions spurred by the short-lived 
              coordination of social movements and NGOs. The appearance and success 
              of the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2003 
              would be the concrete expression of these hopes. 
            These new structures and forms of action brought 
              the Alliance to redefine its position within the whole of the construction 
              dynamics of a world civil society. On the one hand, the visibility 
              and activism of the latter made these considerably appealing to 
              many Allies. On the other hand, those movements made it possible 
              to clarify the position of the Alliance, torn, at that point, between 
              the AlliesÕ contradictory aspirations. The Alliance, a pluralistic 
              proposal-building process, was in a complementary, not a competitive 
              position with regard to these other dynamics. 
            Affirmation of this specificity led to underscoring 
              the AllianceÕs specific characteristics: long-term continuity, insistence 
              on the methods; the determination to draw up solid proposals, the 
              search for dialogue; the determination to reflect the diversity 
              of the whole world.  
             
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